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This paper examines the current issues and shortfalls of psychological PSYOP products from twenty-five to eight PSYOP personnel. In addition to these personnel reductions, the PSYOP commercial contracts with a new Afghanistan public relations firm which was contracted to propose, write, and translate, stories to partially address the reduction was declared legally insufficient and the contract terminated for the good the US Government. Due to existing US funding processes these contracts for PSYOP products were not reestablished. In July of 2006, Regional Command (RC) South PSYOP forces lead by a British PSYOP unit, were reassigned from the US control to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). During this transistion to NATO, the RC South PSYOP unit also suffered a reduction of personnel and forces including US personnel who were part of PSYOP product development. The NATO led PSYOP effort had an entirely different focus than the US PSYOP effort, and no longer supported the US Strategic Communiciations plan. All of these factors contributed to the decline of US capacity and capability in Afghanistan to react to a nimble, unconstrained, opponent in the information and influence realm.
As the US continues to face non-state actors in ideological struggles, garnering influence external to the US and denying support to an enemy are critical to influencing Communications process, including the need to shape the enviroment. Now, providing access and information to the media is critical to the process of strategic communications, a tool of US policy 7 The PAO now has a responsibility to be proactive in the Strategic Communications process, and not return to a passive role, utilizing RTQ. It was always the job of the PAO to arrange access for local and international media (as operational requirements dictate), but now the PAO message should be tied to the Strategic Communications plan. Killcullen, a counterinsurgency expert, noted that the "information side of Al-Qaida's operation is primary; the physical is merely the tool to achieve a propaganda result".
The information part of every operation is planned as well as the actual attack. 24 During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, freedom of movement for embedded media, along with the volume of their reports and access to regional media, combined to effectively disseminate Strategic Communications. Worldwide audiences were able to cross-check information through multiple sources and multiple networks, most with twenty-four hour news coverage. 25 Afghan reporters that are willing to travel to combat areas or to or other newsworthy events have been (and remain) unable to do so because of limited transportation capability of the Afghan Government and US Military.
One effect of this limited ability to travel is that the Afghan press often produces reports based on questionable sources, with little factual or verifiable information. The insurgents provide primary sources to the regional media, unconstrained by concerns for accuracy. Fourth, expansion of the PSYOP product development capacity begins with resourcing the Afghanistan PSYOP Product Development Cell (PDC) to produce more than just four hours of programming every two weeks. Currently, the US effort in
Afghanistan operates at about ten hours per day, and only five and half days per week.
Increasing the amount of Afghanistan PSYOP product development personnel and translators each to thirty would allow the PDC to provide twenty-four hour support to the JTF Commander. This expanded capability would give the PDC the ability to surge production to meet un-forcasted events and provide support in a more timely manner.
In addition to increased hours, the PDC must expand its message languages. As of Endnotes:
